This research examined the development of inhibition in a locomotor context. In a within-subjects design, infants received high-and low-demand locomotor A-not-B tasks. In Experiment 1, walking 13-month-old infants followed an indirect path to a goal. In a control condition, infants took a direct route. In Experiment 2, crawling and walking 13-month-old infants crawled through a tunnel to reach a goal at the other end and received the same control condition as in Experiment 1. In both experiments, perseverative errors occurred more often in the high-demand condition than in the low-demand condition. Moreover, in Experiment 2, walkers perseverated more than crawlers, and extent of perseveration was related to infants' locomotor experience. In Experiment 3, the authors addressed a possible confound in Experiment 2 between locomotor expertise and locomotor posture. Novice crawlers perseverated in the difficult tunnels condition, behaving more like novice walkers than expert crawlers. As predicted by a cognitive capacity account of infant perseveration, overtaxed attentional resources resulted in a cognition-action trade-off. Experts who found the task less motorically effortful than novices had more cognitive resources available for problem solving.
In Piaget's (1954) classic A-not-B manual search task, infants reach to one location (A) to uncover a hidden object that they have watched an experimenter hide. After repeatedly hiding the object at the same location, usually under a cloth cover or in a covered well, the experimenter hides it at a new location (B), and infants are encouraged to retrieve the object there. Researchers who have recently adopted this task to measure infants' ability to inhibit have found that infants younger than 12 months old perseverate (e.g., Diamond, Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2002) . That is, they reach back to the original hiding location (A), despite having watched the object being hidden at its new location (B), hence, A-not-B error. Before 12 months of age, infants have difficulty inhibiting a behavior they have just performed, even when it is no longer appropriate and despite having full knowledge of the correct response.
There is little controversy over the whether infants exhibit the A-not-B error, but researchers often disagree about why they exhibit this error. Piaget's (1954) original explanation for perseveration in the manual search task was that infants had incomplete mental representations for the hidden objects. Piaget argued that infants perceived the discovery of a hidden object as dependent on their own actions-that the act of reaching for the object contributed to its existence. More recently, alternative explanations have been offered. According to dynamical field theory, repetition of a motor plan and reach kinematics, such as trajectory and velocity, create a motor habit that leads to subsequent perseveration (Clearfield, Diedrich, Smith, & Thelen, 2006; Diedrich, Thelen, Smith, & Corbetta, 2000; Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001) . In a neuropsychological account, memory demands combined with ongoing neural development make it difficult for infants to inhibit prepotent responses (Diamond, 1990 (Diamond, , 1991 Diamond et al., 1997) . With a parallel distributed processing model, weak mental representations for hidden objects (Munakata, 1998) or an inability to guide attention to relevant information when irrelevant information is salient (Stedron, Sahni, & Munakata, 2005) make it difficult for young infants to activate representations that are necessary for overcoming a bias toward the A location.
The dispute over why infants make the A-not-B error may be unresolved because the distinction between the prominent competing theories of infant perseveration is artificial. Emphasis has been placed on either the role of mental phenomena, such as representation formation or memory, or the role of physical phenomena on infants' behavior, such as the repetition of a motor behavior or the layout in which the task takes place. In reality, these domains do not develop in isolation.
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perseveration. In this account, motor and cognitive demands can interfere with task performance because both cognition and action can tap limited attentional resources (e.g., Boudreau & Bushnell, 2000; Maylor, Allison, & Wing, 2001) . For example, recent research with both infants and school-aged children has demonstrated that search errors on spatial tasks increase when the motor demands of the task are increased (Boudreau & Bushnell, 2000; A. D. Smith, Gilchrist, & Hood, 2005) ; healthy young adults are less precise on motor tasks when their attention is divided with a verbal task (Chen et al., 1996; Lamble, Kauranen, Laasko, & Summala, 1999) , and the simultaneous performance of a working memory or divided attention task and a motor task elicits motor instabilities and balance control disruptions in postsurgical patients and in elderly populations with ostensibly stable motor performance (e.g., de Visser, Pauwels, Duysens, Mulder, & Veth, 1998; Lindenberger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 2000; Maylor et al., 2001) .
In a series of locomotor A-not-B tasks parallel to the classic A-not-B reaching task, Berger (2004) also found evidence for a trade-off between cognition (the ability to inhibit) and action (completing a difficult motor task). In these tasks, 13-month-old newly walking infants traveled to a goal several times in a row before the location of the goal changed. The primary outcome measure was whether infants took a new, direct path or whether they perseverated by taking the old path and the long way around to reach the goal in the new location. In a low-motor-demand condition, infants simply walked across flat ground to get to the goal. In a high-motor-demand condition, infants descended a short staircase to reach the goal at the bottom. Infants never took the wrong path or showed signs of perseveration in the low-demand condition. In contrast, 90% of infants showed some form of perseveration on the B trial in the high-demand condition. Perseverative responses ranged from the dramatic-turning away from the goal, taking the wrong staircase all of the way to the floor, and detouring to the goal-to the subtle-vacillation between paths or glancing at the previous goal location. Infants performed the motor demands of descending a staircase, but the trade-off for doing so was perseverating on the old path instead of taking the new, more direct route to the goal.
My original locomotor A-not-B experiments (Berger, 2004 ) demonstrated that motor demands can tax infants' limited attentional resources as significantly as cognitive demands. Infants perseverated more often when the task was motorically demanding because it took so much effort just to perform the task that insufficient attentional resources were left for inhibitory control. Just as Diamond (1990) showed that infants' perseverative response was attenuated when memory demands were lessened, walking on flat ground placed minimal demands on infants, helping them overcome attentional inertia (Diamond, Carlson, & Beck, 2005; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003) and avoid perseverative errors. Thus, cognitive resources are used when complex motor activities are performed, such as maintaining balance on unstable terrain (see also Diamond, 2000) . Because the design eliminated memory demands and allowed movements to vary from trial to trial, these results challenged previous interpretations of perseverative behaviors in infancy in which memory demands (Diamond, 1985 (Diamond, , 1990 or creation of a motor habit (Diedrich et al., 2000; Thelen et al., 2001) were essential for perseveration.
Aim of the Current Study
Three new locomotor A-not-B experiments were carried out to more precisely test the hypothesis that when infants' attentional resources are overtaxed, there is a trade-off between cognition and action resulting in perseveration. As in my original locomotor A-not-B experiments (Berger, 2004) , difficulty varied between conditions in a within-subjects design. All participants received a low-motor-demand version of a locomotor A-not-B task in which they walked over flat ground along a path free of obstacles to reach a goal. Each infant also received a variation of the high-motordemand version of the task. In Experiment 1, infants could reach a caregiver only by an indirect path. The indirect path was considered more difficult than the straight path because infants had to avoid an obstacle in their path on the way to the goal and because making a locomotor detour requires coordinating the whole body to clear the obstacle and get to the goal (Lockman & Adams, 2001) . Infants could still see the caregivers, even though they could not get to them directly, which increased task complexity because they had to inhibit being visually and motorically captured by the goal behind the barrier (Diamond, 1991; Lockman & Adams, 2001) . In Experiment 2, infants could reach the goal in the high-demand condition only through a tunnel. The tunnel was considered more difficult than the straight path because walking infants had to figure out how to modify their posture and locomotor plan to fit themselves inside. Experiment 3 tested whether crawling infants with little locomotor experience would also find the tunnel apparatus more difficult than the control condition.
The first aim of this study was to explore the nature of a cognition-action trade-off. Previous work has typically treated perseveration as an all-or-none behavior, but Berger's (2004) rich data set showed that the appropriate context can elicit continuous and graded perseverative responses. If a trade-off is scaled whereby slight task demands yield slight trade-offs, then different rates of perseveration in each of the different conditions would be predicted depending on degree of difficulty. Experiment 1 was designed to test whether even slight increases in task demands can elicit subtle perseverative behaviors. A cognitive capacity account predicts that infants would perseverate in the indirect path condition more than they would in a control condition but to a lesser degree than they would in a more difficult task. In contrast, similar rates of perseveration among a variety of difficult conditions would be predicted if a trade-off between cognition and action is triggered when a threshold for taxing the system has been crossed, regardless of the magnitude of the task (see, e.g., Thelen et al., 2001) .
The second aim of this study was to explicitly examine the role of expertise on infant perseveration in the locomotor A-not-B tasks. To accomplish this, Experiment 2 compared 13-month-old expert crawlers with a group of novice walkers of the same age. Novices have to expend more effort (attention) to perform a task successfully than do experts (Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002) . Therefore, a cognitive capacity theory would predict that infants for whom the task is inherently most difficult would be most likely to perseverate; specifically, novice walkers would perseverate more often and to a greater extent than expert crawlers of the same age. Finally, in Experiment 3, we addressed a possible confound in Experiment 2 between locomotor expertise and locomotor posture by examining whether novice crawlers behaved more like novice walkers or more like expert crawlers in the same locomotor A-not-B task.
Experiment 1

Method
Participants. Twenty-two 13-month-old (Ϯ1 week; M ϭ 12.97 months) walking infants (11 girls, 11 boys) participated. This age was chosen because 13-month-olds do not typically perseverate in the manual search version of the A-not-B task. Parents reported their infants' locomotor experience in a structured interview (e.g., Berger, Theuring, & Adolph, 2007) . Most infants were Caucasian, middle-class, and lived in the New York City metropolitan area. In most families, at least one parent had a college education. All infants were healthy and born at term and could walk 10 ft (3.05 m) across a room without falling or stopping. Infants received a small gift and a diploma for participating.
Procedure and apparatus. Using a within-subject design, each infant received a low-motor-demand A-not-B condition (direct path on the floor) that served as a control for a high-motordemand version of the task (indirect path on the floor). Pathways in the direct path condition were configured in a V shape, with infants starting each trial at the point of the V between the entrances to each path ( Figure 1A ). The caregiver was located 7.5 ft (2.29 m) away at the far end of one of the arms of the V. To reach the caregiver, infants took a direct path. After the A trials, the caregiver moved to the far end of the other arm of the V to the B location. Pathways in the indirect path condition were configured in a T shape, with infants starting each trial at the bottom of the T ( Figure 1B) . To reach the caregiver, who was visible through the netting, infants traveled up the leg of the T, then navigated a fork in the path, which required them to inhibit going directly to their caregiver. Infants had to travel 7.5 ft (2.29 m) of path to reach the caregiver, although the absolute distance was only 5.3 ft (1.62 m).
The pathways were delineated by netting hung from 18-in. (45.72 cm) moveable posts that could be easily reconfigured between conditions while keeping the goal visible. The top of the netting was 18 in. from the floor where it attached to the posts and 11 in. (27.94) from the floor where it dipped between posts. This fell between infants' hips and shoulders.
Half of the infants started with the low-demand condition, and the other half started with the high-demand condition. Infants' caregivers always served as the goal, sitting at the A and B locations and encouraging infants to come to them by offering toys and verbal support. Caregiver location was counterbalanced between right and left. Infants started each trial standing upright. The pathways were oriented so that infants started each trial at the same place, regardless of condition. The testing room had distinctive reference points, such as a door, a couch, and audio/visual equipment. Other than the configuration of the pathways, the two conditions were identical: The number of trials infants received, their orientation in the room, and the location of the goal on A and B trials were the same between conditions. All sessions were videotaped.
Infants in my original locomotor A-not-B experiments (Berger, 2004) received warm-up trials to familiarize them with the stairs, and infants typically receive warm-up trials in the manual search version of the A-not-B task as well (e.g., L. B. Smith, Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999) . In this study, infants received two warm-up trials to allow them to acclimate to the game and to give them a chance to explore the novel nets and posts. Warm-up trials were structured the same way as regular A trials, except that the experimenter occasionally rolled a ball or tossed a toy down the path to the caregiver to demonstrate the game to infants who needed encouragement to walk. Infants were also allowed to play with the nets and posts so that they would not be distracted by them during the A and B trials. Following the warm-up trials, infants received three A trials and one B trial. Infants were encouraged to go to their caregiver at the start of every trial.
Measures of perseveration. Measures of perseveration were independent, so that, in principle, infants could display multiple perseverative behaviors in each trial. For example, infants could look to the old location, turn back and forth between paths, and eventually choose a path, each of which was a separate, observable response.
Locomotor perseveration. The primary outcome measure was whether infants took a new, direct path to reach the goal or whether they perseverated by taking the old, familiar path to the end and detouring around the pathway to reach the goal. Partial locomotor perseveration was coded by counting the number of shifts in direction that infants made before eventually heading down the B path. For example, one shift meant that the infant started down one path but switched to the other. This variable describes trials where infants initially embarked on the A path before returning to the starting location and subsequently choosing the B path.
Visual perseveration. Some infants did not use the old A path to reach the goal but, nevertheless, did look toward A as they walked toward B, just as infants sometimes looked toward the A hiding location as they reached toward B in the A-not-B manual Figure 1 . Schematic of the A and B locations in the low-demand direct path condition, the high-demand indirect path condition, and the tunnels apparatus. Infants started each trial from the same position on the floor, denoted by X. Arrows in the direct and indirect path conditions indicate the direction infants faced when they were put down at the starting location and the direction they took to head down the path.
search task (Diamond, 1990; Hofstadter & Reznick, 1996; Piaget, 1954) . Logically, if infants walked down a path, then they looked in the direction of the goal at the end of that path. For purposes of data analysis and to keep measures of perseveration independent, if infants already received credit for locomotor perseveration on a given trial, then they did not get extra credit for visual perseveration. Visual perseveration was operationalized as a behavior to be coded only if locomotor perseveration did not also occur on that trial.
Backing. This behavior reflects infants' conflict between wanting to reach the goal but not wanting to take either an incorrect path or a new path. In the locomotor A-not-B task in which infants had to descend staircases to reach their goal, Berger (2004) anecdotally reported an infant who attempted to back off of a starting platform on the B trial, rather than take the wrong staircase to the floor or the new staircase to the goal. To explore this potential indicator of perseveration, avoidance behaviors at the start of each trial were systematically coded. Infants were prevented from leaving the walkway, but their attempts to do so were noted.
Latency reflects the amount of time it took infants to make their decision about which path to take from the time they were placed at the starting location until they left that location. Trial duration reflects the time it took infants to reach the goal after the experimenter placed them at the starting location. Both duration measures, latency and trial duration, serve a similar purpose-to capture whether hesitation occurs after the goal location is changed. However, they yield somewhat different information about the timing of infants' decision making. Differences in latency would suggest that infants made their decisions immediately at the start of each trial, whereas differences in trial duration alone would suggest that infants act quickly at the start of each trial and monitor or update their locomotor strategies once they are in progress (Berger & Adolph, 2003; Berger, Adolph, & Lobo, 2005) .
Results and Discussion
A researcher scored infants' responses from videotapes. A second researcher scored data from 33% of the trials. Percentage of agreement ranged from 94% to 100% for categorical measures (locomotor perseveration, looking, and backing). Correlation coefficients ranged from r ϭ .99 to r ϭ 1.0 for continuous measures (direction shifts, trial duration, and latency).
The comparisons of primary interest were (a) infants' behaviors before and after the switch in caregiver location and (b) their behaviors in the high-and low-demand conditions on the B trial. Each child provided four scores for each variable in each condition where preswitch trials were compared with the postswitch trial. For within-subject comparisons, group means were weighted to allow a single degree-of-freedom comparison (Keppel, 1991) . For measures of perseveration, 2 (low demand vs. high demand) ϫ 2 (A trials vs. B trial) repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with difference contrasts compared the B trial with the A trials. An interaction between task difficulty and trial driven by the B trial would suggest that increased motor demands yield higher rates of perseveration.
Only one infant (4.5%) perseverated on the B trial on any measure in the low-demand direct condition, whereas 11 infants (50%) perseverated on the B trial on at least one measure in the high-demand indirect condition. Perseverative behaviors ranged from a mere glance at the old location before taking the new path directly to the goal to a complete detour down the A path around to the B location.
Measures of perseveration.
The most stringent index of failure to inhibit behaviors directed toward A was locomotor perseveration, where infants went all the way down the A path to their caregivers on the B trial. Only two infants (one in the direct condition and one in the indirect condition) evidenced locomotor perseveration. However, the indirect path did elicit more subtle signs of perseveration. For example, infants were more likely to vacillate about which path to take on the B trial in the more demanding indirect path condition. Vacillation was indexed by direction shifts, where infants started down one path and then reversed direction to go down the other path. Five infants (all in the indirect path condition) shifted directions at least once on the B trial-four of the five shifted direction several times before eventually choosing a path. The ANOVA on the number of direction shifts revealed an interaction between task difficulty and trial, direction shifts) than in the low-demand condition (M ϭ 0 direction shifts).
A more subtle draw to the A location after the caregiver had moved away (but not so strong a draw as to elicit whole-body vacillation) was reflected by looking in the other direction. Infants received credit for looking or not looking; the number of times infants looked to a location was not coded. Of those infants who did not perseverate by taking the A path all the way to the goal at B (n ϭ 20), 35%, all in the indirect condition, looked to A before going to the caregiver at B. The ANOVA revealed main effects for trial, F(1, 18) ϭ 5.70, p ϭ .03, main effects for task difficulty, F(1, 18) ϭ 5.59, p ϭ .03, and an interaction between the two, F(1, 18) ϭ 7.88, p ϭ .01 ( Figure 2B ).
Five infants (22%; all on the B trial in the indirect condition) attempted to back out of the pathway rather than take a path to the end. The ANOVA showed main effects for task difficulty, F(1, 21) ϭ 6.18, p ϭ .02, and trial, F(1, 21) ϭ 6.18, p ϭ .02, and an interaction between the two, F(1, 21) ϭ 6.18, p ϭ .02 ( Figure 2C) .
One explanation for perseverative responses in a high-demand condition concerns encoding. If infants spent more time on the A trials, they might have more deeply encoded the A location (e.g., Thelen et al., 2001) . Indeed, in Berger (2004) , infants took more time to descend the stairs in the high-demand condition than to walk over the straight path in the low-demand condition. Here, trial duration (range ϭ 2.73 s to 1 min, 21.40 s) started when infants were free to walk down the pathway and ended when they reached their caregiver. Although trial duration on the B trial in the difficult condition was longer than all other conditions, the ANOVA revealed no significant differences in the times that infants took to walk down the direct (A trials: 6.58 s; B trial: 6.18 s) and indirect (A trials: 10.31 s; B trial: 12.18 s) paths on the A and B trials. Infants perseverated because increased task difficulty made attentional resources unavailable for inhibition, rather than because they spent more time on the indirect paths.
Individual differences. Infants' locomotor experience served as a crude measure of expertise on the assumption that the infants who had been walking longer would be better at getting around in that posture because of accumulated practice (Adolph, Vereijken, & Shrout, 2003; Shea, Lai, Black, & Park, 2000) . Walking experience was negatively correlated with trial duration on the B trial in the low-demand direct condition, r(21) ϭ Ϫ.46, p Ͻ .04, and was marginally related to trial duration in the high-demand indirect condition, r(22) ϭ Ϫ.39, p ϭ .07.
To explore the relationship between locomotor experience and perseveration, infants were assigned a value from 0 to 3 indicating the extent of their perseverative behavior. Zero indicated that they did not perseverate in any way, 1 indicated visual perseveration, 2 indicated partial perseveration, and 3 indicated locomotor perseveration. Correlations between walking experience and extent of perseveration in the direct path and indirect path conditions were not significant.
Assuming that increased task difficulty would cause infants to take longer to choose a path, latency on the first trial of each condition assessed infants' initial proficiency on the task before they had any practice. Latency started when the experimenter released infants at the start of the trial and ended when they took their first step down a path. A point biserial correlation between latency to walk on the first trial in the direct path condition and whether they perseverated on any measure on the B trial was significant, r pb (21) ϭ .59, p Ͻ .01. The longer the infants' latency at the outset of the direct path condition, the more likely they were to perseverate on the B trial of that condition. Infants' latency to walk on the first trial of the indirect path condition was unrelated to perseverative behavior. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the indirect task was simply difficult for all infants. Alternatively, latency was unrelated to infants' later perseveration because they did not make their decisions until they had reached the intersection of the path. However, other measures of infants' perseverative behavior, such as looking and backing, did occur at the beginning of the trial rather than at the path intersection, suggesting that they were not waiting until midway through the trial to make or carry out a motor decision.
Once infants begin walking independently, they tend to want to walk from then on (Adolph, 1997; McGraw, 1935) , even though, at first, walking is slower and more effortful than crawling Freedland & Bertenthal, 1994) . In the face of infants' strong desire to walk, switching strategies for locomotion from walking to crawling might indicate that they found the task difficult and were attempting to make it easier. On the B trial, five infants (23%) in the indirect path condition switched from walking to crawling, but only two infants (9%) in the direct path condition switched, which is comparable to the proportion of infants who switched on the A trials in both conditions. A point biserial correlation revealed that infants who switched from walking to crawling in the high-demand indirect path condition had significantly less walking experience (M ϭ 0.48 months) than infants who did not switch (M ϭ 1.60 months), r pb (22) ϭ 2.27, p Ͻ .02. Switching from walking to crawling was rare in the low-demand condition (n ϭ 2), but those who did switch had the least walking experience. A point biserial correlation between experience and switching approached significance, r pb (22) ϭ 1.50, p ϭ .07. Fisher's exact tests found no significant relationship between whether infants switched from walking to crawling and whether they perseverated in either the direct or indirect conditions. Summary. Infants demonstrated a variety of perseverative behaviors on the postswitch trial in the indirect path condition that they did not demonstrate on other trials. Experiment 1 replicated the general finding of my original locomotor A-not-B study (Berger, 2004 ) that 13-month-old walking infants perseverated more often in a high-demand motor task than in a low-demand motor task. However, fewer infants perseverated in the indirect path on flat ground (50%) than in my original locomotor A-not-B study, in which infants had to descend a novel set of stairs (90%; Berger, 2004) . In addition, the extent of infants' perseverative behaviors was not as dramatic as in the high-demand condition of my original locomotor perseveration study.
These results suggest that the ability to inhibit may be scaled to task demands. For example, carrying out several cognitive demands simultaneously resulted in worse performance than performing each simpler task individually (Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006) . Multiple cognitive demands in a task combined additively to diminish inhibitory control. To test this concept systematically in the context of cognition-action tradeoffs, Experiment 2 further manipulated the motor demands of the high-demand condition in a locomotor A-not-B task. An even more difficult version was designed to assess whether increasing task difficulty by increasing motor demands would elicit proportionally greater rates of perseveration. Experiment 2 also consid-ered the role of expertise by allowing participants' level of expertise to vary. Two new age-matched groups of 13-month-old infants-crawlers and walkers-with different levels of locomotor skill were compared.
Experiment 2 Method
Participants. Twenty-three 13-month-old (Ϯ1 week; M ϭ 13.04 months) walking infants (10 girls, 13 boys) and twelve 13-month-old (Ϯ1 week; M ϭ 13.03 months) crawling infants (6 girls, 6 boys) participated. Parents reported infants' locomotor experience in a structured interview. Crawlers had approximately twice as much crawling experience (range ϭ 1.45 to 5.49 months; M ϭ 3.41 months) as walkers had walking experience (range ϭ 1 day to 3.52 months; M ϭ 1.62 months). All infants were healthy and born at term and could travel 10 ft (3.05 m) across a room without falling or stopping. Approximately two thirds of the sample was Caucasian, with the remaining one third primarily Hispanic. Most infants were from middle-to upper-middle-class families and lived in the New York City metropolitan area. In 26 of the 30 families for whom education data were available, at least one parent had a college education. Infants received a small gift for participating.
Procedure and apparatus. Walkers and crawlers received both low-demand (direct path on floor) and high-demand (tunnel) locomotor A-not-B tasks. Walking infants started each trial upright. Crawling infants started each trial on hands and knees. As in Experiment 1, starting condition and goal locations were counterbalanced, infants' parents served as the goal, and parents used toys and verbal support to encourage their infants to reach them. Sessions were videotaped.
The same net pathways from Experiment 1 were arranged in the V configuration for the low-demand direct path condition (see Figure 1A ). For the tunnels condition, two nylon tunnels (6.5 ft [197 cm] long ϫ 2 ft [60 cm] wide ϫ 2 ft [60 cm] high) stretched over a frame of collapsible poles connected by internal shock cords were arranged in the same configuration as the direct paths. Infants started each trial at the point of the V, where the entrances to the two tunnels met ( Figure 1C ). To reach their caregivers-always audible and visible either by peering through the tunnel or, for walking infants, standing on tiptoes and looking over the top of the tunnel-infants had to crawl through the tunnel. The number of trials, the orientation of the pathways in the room, and the location of the caregiver were the same in both conditions.
Results and Discussion
A researcher scored infants' responses from videotapes of the sessions. A second researcher scored data from 33% of the trials. Percentage of agreement ranged from 94% to 100% for categorical measures, and correlation coefficients ranged from r(68) ϭ .95 to r(68) ϭ 1.0 for measures of duration. Measures of perseveration were analyzed with 2 (crawl vs. walk) ϫ 2 (low demand vs. high demand) ϫ 2 (A trials vs. B trial) mixed within-subjects ANOVAs with locomotor status as the between-subjects variable and task difficulty and trial number as within-subjects variables. As described in Experiment 1, difference contrasts were used to compare infants' behavior on the A and B trials. One walking infant did not contribute data to the low-demand condition and another did not contribute data to the high-demand condition. Therefore, repeated measures analyses include only 21 of the walking infants.
Only three walkers (14%) and two crawlers (17%) perseverated on the B trial on any measure in the low-demand direct path condition, whereas 14 walkers (64%) and seven crawlers (58%) perseverated on the B trial on at least one measure in the highdemand tunnels condition. Two walking infants found the B trial so difficult in the tunnels condition that they could not reach their caregivers with either path. All outcome measures were defined as in Experiment 1.
Measures of perseveration. The high-demand tunnels condition elicited higher rates of locomotor perseveration, especially in the walkers. Two walking infants (9%) went all of the way to the end of the A path before detouring to their caregivers at the B location in the low-demand condition, whereas 11 walkers (50%) did so in the high-demand condition. In contrast, only three crawlers (25%) in the tunnels condition displayed locomotor perseveration. Cochran's Q analyses for related samples confirmed that walking infants perseverated significantly more often in the tunnels condition than in the direct path condition, Q(1) ϭ 8.33, p Ͻ .01 ( Figure 3A) .
The tunnels elicited higher rates of direction shifts in both crawlers and walkers. Thirteen infants (one crawler in the direct path condition; 33% of crawlers and 36% of walkers in the tunnels condition) shifted the direction they were headed at least once on their way to reach the goal on the B trial. The ANOVA revealed main effects for task difficulty, F(1, 31) ϭ 7.72, p Ͻ .01, and trial, F(1, 31) ϭ 12.74, p Ͻ .01, and an interaction between task difficulty and trial, F(1, 31) ϭ 9.44, p Ͻ .01 ( Figure 3B ). Both crawlers and walkers shifted direction more often on the B trial than on the A trials in the high-demand condition, but there was no trial difference for either group in the low-demand condition.
Looking in the other direction was assessed for the subset of infants who did not perseverate by taking the wrong path to the goal. The B trial in the tunnels condition elicited the highest rates of looking for both crawlers and walkers. Eight infants (25% of crawlers and 40% of walkers in the tunnels condition) looked over to A when the caregiver was at B before proceeding. The ANOVA confirmed a main effect of task difficulty, F(1, 16) ϭ 6.56, p ϭ .02, and an interaction between task difficulty and trial, F(1, 16) ϭ 5.76, p ϭ .03 ( Figure 3C ). Infants looked back to the A location during the B trial in the tunnels condition more often than other conditions. Infants did not look significantly to the B location during the A trials.
As in Experiment 1, avoiding the apparatus was uncommon in the low-demand condition-only one crawler (8%) on the B trial attempted to back out of the pathway. Unlike in Experiment 1, backing out of the pathway was also uncommon in the highdemand condition. Only three walkers (14%) on A trials and two walkers (9%) on the B trial attempted to avoid the tunnels. Of interest, three crawlers (25%; two on the first warm-up trial and one on both warm-ups) and eight walkers (36%; six on the first warm-up trial and two on both warm-ups) attempted to back out of the pathway on the warm-up tunnels trials, indicating that on a first attempt without practice, the tunnels were significantly more difficult to navigate than the direct path. Only one walker avoided the direct path on the warm-up trials.
Individual differences. For walking infants, locomotor experience was negatively correlated with trial duration on the B trial in the low-demand direct path condition, r(20) ϭ Ϫ.45, p Ͻ .05. Less experienced walkers took longer to complete the trial. The B trial in the high-demand tunnels condition was difficult regardless of walking experience. For crawling infants, locomotor experience was not correlated with trial duration on the B trials in either condition. Task difficulty, trial, and locomotor status did not affect trial duration.
The scale described in Experiment 1 was used to categorize the extent of perseveration of each infant. Correlations revealed no relationship between locomotor experience and extent of perseveration for crawling and walking infants in the direct path condition because perseveration was so rare. Neither was there a relationship between locomotor experience and perseveration for crawling infants in the tunnels condition. However, for walking infants in the tunnels condition, locomotor experience was negatively correlated with perseveration, r(20) ϭ Ϫ.48, p ϭ .03. The more walking experience an infant had, the less extreme their perseverative behavior was likely to be.
On most trials, infants crawled through the tunnels without a problem. However, 15 walking infants (68%) on 39 trials (30%) struggled in some way. Occasionally, infants attempted to enter the tunnel upright, bumping into it as they walked. Most infants who had difficulty initially crawled in, but then attempted a switch back to walking midtunnel, even if it meant dragging their heads along the roof as they walked (Figure 4) . The number of times infants switched locomotor strategies on a single trial ranged from one to six times. Only two walkers switched to crawling on a direct path trial. A point biserial correlation revealed that infants who had trouble crawling through the tunnel had more walking experience (M ϭ 1.98 months) than infants who easily switched to crawling (M ϭ 1.17 months), r pb (18) ϭ 2.01, p Ͻ .03. There was no relationship between walking experience and locomotor strategies in the direct path condition. As with infants' attempts to back out of the pathway, walking infants' difficulty figuring out how to fit their bodies into the tunnels happened most frequently on the two warm-up trials before they had any practice with the apparatus. A point biserial correlation on the relationship between the number of times infants switched locomotor strategies and whether they perseverated was not significant. A Fisher's exact test found no significant relationship between whether infants switched from walking to crawling and whether they perseverated in the easy direct path condition. However, a Fisher's exact test found a trend toward a relationship between whether infants switched from walking to crawling in the difficult tunnels condition and whether they perseverated, p ϭ .06. Of the seven infants who did not switch from walking to crawling, five perseverated. In contrast, of the 15 infants who did switch from walking to crawling, only four perseverated.
Comparisons across experiments. task. Although infants often exhibited several perseverative behaviors in a single trial, in this figure each infant is represented only once for the most extreme form of perseveration displayed on the B trial. Infants rarely perseverated in the low-demand control condition ( Figure 5 , left, shows data for walkers collapsed across all four experiments). As expected, the proportion of infants who perseverated in some way in the high-demand conditions increased as task difficulty increased. More important, infants' degree of perseveration was scaled to the task's level of difficulty. Infants' difficulty with switching from walking to crawling to fit into the tunnels revealed a confound in the experimental design. Walking infants' requirement of switching postures to fit into the tunnels was evidently an extra task demand that crawling infants did not have. This means that not only did locomotor experience differ between the two groups but possibly task difficulty did as well, even though the apparatus was the same. To address this confound, Experiment 3 was designed to pit locomotor experience against the physical demands of the task associated with locomotor posture. If the tunnels were more difficult than the direct path for walking infants because fitting into the tunnels added an extra step to their motor plan (i.e., Bushnell, McKenzie, Lawrence, & Connell, 1995) , then even novice crawlers should not find the tunnels condition difficult because their bodies would fit into the tunnel regardless of locomotor experience. If, on the other hand, tunnels were difficult for novice walkers because any demanding activity, be it mental or physical, taxes infants' cognitive capacity (i.e., Berger, 2004) , then novice crawlers should also perseverate more on the tunnels condition than the floor condition.
Experiment 3 Method
Participants. Seventeen crawling infants (eight girls, nine boys) participated. Criterion for participation was having under 2 months of experience crawling 10 ft (3.05 m) across a room without having to stop or rest. All infants were healthy and born at term. Most infants were Caucasian, middle-class, and lived in the New York City metropolitan area. In most families, at least one parent had a college education. Infants' crawling experience ranged from just 2 days to 1.84 months (M ϭ 1.20 months).
Parents reported infants' locomotor experience in a structured interview. Infants' average age was 9.52 months (range ϭ 7.76 to 11.74 months). Infants received a small gift for participating.
Procedure and apparatus. Crawling infants received both low-demand (direct path on floor) and high-demand (tunnel) locomotor A-not-B tasks. Infants started each trial on hands and knees. As in Experiments 1 and 2, starting condition and goal locations were counterbalanced, infants' parents served as the goal, and parents encouraged infants to reach them with toys and verbal support. Sessions were videotaped. The same net pathways from Experiments 1 and 2 were arranged in the V configuration for the low-demand direct path condition. The same tunnels pathways from Experiment 2 were arranged in the V configuration for the high-demand condition.
Results and Discussion
A researcher scored infants' responses from videotapes of the sessions. A second researcher scored data from 33% of the trials. Percentage of agreement for locomotor perseveration was 100%.
The high-demand tunnels condition elicited higher rates of locomotor perseveration than the low-demand floor condition. Only two infants (11.8%) went all of the way to the end of the A path before detouring to their caregivers at the B location in the low-demand condition, whereas seven infants (41.2%) did so in the high-demand condition. Cochran's Q analyses for related samples confirmed that novice crawlers perseverated significantly more often in the tunnels condition than in the direct path condition, Q(1) ϭ 5.00, p Ͻ .03.
Novice crawlers' pattern of perseverative errors was more like novice walkers' than like expert crawlers' patterns. Because novices must allocate more attention than experts to carry out a task, novice crawlers and walkers utilized attentional resources to carry out the physical task demands of the locomotor A-not-B task at the expense of the cognitive demands, namely, the ability to inhibit a prepotent response. Clearly, the task components were different for novice crawlers and novice walkers, because crawlers did not have the demand of figuring out how to fit their bodies into the tunnel. However, the cognitive resources that infants use to process novelty in general may leave them with fewer cognitive resources with which to do the task.
General Discussion
Three experiments examined whether and how the manipulation of task demands and locomotor expertise affected the extent of infants' perseverative behaviors. Task demands were manipulated with a within-subjects design with each participant receiving a motorically low-demand A-not-B task that served as a control for a motorically high-demand one. Experiment 1 demonstrated that seemingly trivial changes to a task can elicit subtle perseverative behaviors. Expertise was measured in Experiment 2 with an agematched design comparing 13-month-old novice walkers with expert crawlers on the same set of tasks. The extent to which each group found the high-demand condition difficult differed. Experiment 3 addressed a potential confound in Experiment 2 between locomotor expertise and locomotor posture. Novice crawlers behaved more like novice walkers than expert crawlers in the extent of their perseverative behaviors. In A-not-B tasks, infants' ability to inhibit has typically been assessed with a dichotomous outcome measure: either infants reach correctly to B on the B trial or they perseverate and reach back to A on the B trial (e.g., Diamond, 1985; Diedrich, Highlands, Spahr, Thelen, & Smith, 2001; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2002 ; but see Spencer & Shutte, 2004) . This is a common assessment strategy for studying inhibition. For example, in early studies, researchers who used the dimensional-change card-sort task to assess preschoolers' ability to inhibit claimed that by the time children were 4 or 5 years old, they could inhibit sorting cards according to a rule that they had been using and switch to a new sorting rule (see Zelazo, Muller, & Frye, 2003 , for a review). However, using the more sensitive measure of reaction time, rather than the typical measure of accuracy, Diamond and Kirkham (2005) showed that even adults get slower when they have to inhibit their response during the dimensional-change card-sort task. In the current study, I used sensitive measures that allowed for a range of behaviors to be expressed, such as direction shifts, latency, and other forms of hesitation á là Diamond and Kirkham (2005) , and this revealed the nature of infants' inhibition to be a continuous and not a dichotomous phenomenon. The detailed coding of infants' behaviors in response to the locomotor A-not-B task was important for precisely characterizing the gradual development of inhibition.
As predicted by existing theories of cognition-action trade-offs, greater motor demands of the task led to greater cognitive errors. Cross-experiment comparisons revealed that perseveration was frequent in all high-demand conditions but was scaled to the level of difficulty of the task. Task difficulty, in turn, depended on infant characteristics (locomotor expertise) and task characteristics (motor demands). Locomotor perseveration was not a particularly relevant outcome measure for Experiment 1 but was frequently observed in Experiments 2 and 3. As a result, some of the subtler measures of perseveration that reached significance in Experiment 1 were less common in Experiment 2: Infants were already fully perseverating to the greatest extent possible, so subtler perseverative behaviors were not observed. There is ample evidence that the typical development of infants' memory is graded, but most evidence for the graded nature of attention comes from studies of adults with brain injuries (see Munakata, 2001 , for a review). Capitalizing on infants' inexpertise supplements the literature on the graded nature of attention with research from the developmental domain.
As expected, walking infants' performance was significantly related to their locomotor experience in the low-demand direct path conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 but not in the high-demand indirect path and tunnels conditions. The low-demand condition was still difficult for the most novice of the walking group, whereas the high-demand conditions were difficult for all of the novice walkers, regardless of differences in experience. In contrast, locomotor experience and skill were unrelated to performance for expert crawlers in the tunnels condition. Crawlers' ample locomotor experience made the motor demands of the task negligible which, in turn, made available the cognitive resources necessary to compensate for other task demands.
Novices lacked the attentional resources available to experts, so they attended to primary task demands, such as choosing a path and walking, but that left them unable to attend to the task's secondary demand of inhibition (Beilock et al., 2002) . The tunnels condition may have been ostensibly easy-infants only had to crawl to reach their caregiver-but it turned out to be among the most difficult of all high-demand conditions. A particular problem in Experiment 2 was that walking infants had a double dose of behaviors to inhibit. Having to switch from walking to crawling in the tunnels condition was an unexpected extra difficulty for walking infants. In addition to inhibiting taking the A path on the B trial, infants also had to inhibit their preferred locomotor method of walking to carry out the task. Switching to crawling tends to be difficult for new walkers (McGraw, 1935) , and infants preferred to be novice walkers over expert crawlers even if it meant a deterioration in their performance. In one dramatic example, new walkers on the brink of a steep 36°slope stood up from a crawling position, in which they had been making accurate locomotor decisions, to walk right over the edge (Adolph, 1997) .
This result creates a confound between expertise and task difficulty in trying to interpret why walking infants perseverated more often and to a greater extent than crawling infants on the B trial in the tunnels condition. Walking infants' attentional resources may have been used because of inexpertise, the extra step of switching strategies, or a combination of both. However, infants' walking experience was negatively correlated with the extent of their perseveration, suggesting that expertise does have an important role in allocation of resources. Experiment 3 directly addressed this confound by testing novice crawlers in the same tunnels experiment that was challenging for new walkers but was easy for expert crawlers. Novice crawlers demonstrated the same pattern of perseverative errors as novice walkers, which suggests that perseverative errors for both groups of novices were due to attentional demands associated with inexpertise, rather than the specific demands associated with fitting an upright body into a relatively low tunnel. Future studies should measure infants' expertise more directly, such as with footfall measures (e.g., Adolph et al., 2003) , but even crudely measuring skill with months of experience yielded results consistent with previous studies. For example, 6.5-month-old infants' lack of expertise in object knowledge elicited perseveration in a violation of expectation task (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2003) , and novice crawlers and walkers could not find the goal in a spatial memory task at which expert crawlers and walkers succeeded (Clearfield, 2004) .
Locomotor experience may have influenced the locomotor strategies that walking infants used to reach the goal in the highdemand conditions. Walkers who switched to crawling may have done so as a strategy for freeing up attentional resources so that they could avoid more extreme perseverative behavior. For example, in the original locomotor A-not-B task (Berger, 2004) , infants who had strategies for reducing motor demands in the stairs condition were less likely to perseverate than infants who did not. Those who backed or scooted down the stairs or held onto the experimenter or banister for support instead of walking down made stair descent biomechanically easier for themselves on the A trials. These infants perseverated less often on the B trial in the stairs condition than infants who walked down the stairs. Similar to newly walking infants who return to a less mature, but expert, reaching strategy to reduce the effort of learning a new skill (Corbetta & Bojczyk, 2002) , here too the new walkers who were able to switch to crawling may have lightened the cognitive load of the task by returning to a more expert posture. Future work is planned to examine whether the manipulation of infants' locomotor strategies systematically changes their ability to inhibit.
Why did infants perseverate in the locomotor A-not-B tasks, rather than show another type of performance decrement? Not all studies showing a trade-off between cognition and action find that performance is sacrificed in the same way. For example, young adults (mean age ϭ 25 years) showed decrements in both cognitive and motor performance when they had to memorize a list of words while simultaneously walking on a balance beam. A group of older adults (mean age ϭ 66 years) also showed impairments on both components of the task, but their memory performance was significantly worse than the younger group. The older adults preserved their motor performance as well as they could at the expense of their cognitive performance because the cost for falling was greater for them than for the younger group (Li, Lindenberger, Freund, & Baltes, 2001) . In this study, the experimental design required infants to inhibit on the B trial, a cognitive skill that is fragile because of a still-developing prefrontal cortex (Diamond, 1988 (Diamond, , 1990 Diamond et al., 1997) . Expert crawlers and novice walkers eventually reached their caregivers, but for the novices, it was at the expense of an efficient route.
Together, these results have important implications for the existing theories of infant perseveration. The dynamic systems theory emphasizes motor habit as crucial for infant perseveration in the A-not-B manual search task (Clearfield et al., 2006; Diedrich et al., 2000; Thelen et al., 2001) . These findings challenge the importance of motor habit per se for perseveration because in this experiment walkers switched between walking and crawling but perseverated more than experienced crawlers who only crawled. Evidently, expert crawlers had enough locomotor skill to find the motor demands of the task negligible, despite the repetitive behavior from trial to trial. Thus, they could devote all of their attentional resources to inhibition. That infants backed out of the pathway at the start of a trial, rather than encountering the bend in the indirect path and suddenly having trouble, for example, suggests that planning occurred at the level of trajectory planning, rather than at the level of execution (Lew, Hopkins, Owen, & Green, 2007) .
Repetitive movements may elicit perseveration in some contexts, perhaps when actors are novices at the requisite skill, but such movements are not necessary for perseveration (Spencer & Schutte, 2004) . Moreover, perseveration in a locomotor task suggests that the specific physical act of reaching in the A-not-B task is not crucial to the error (L. B. Smith et al., 1999) . Instead, it is likely that it is a lack of expertise for the task at hand that contributes to the difficulty of the task. Indeed, at the time of the A-not-B error, infants are still in the process of becoming skilled reachers (L. B. Smith et al., 1999, p. 237) . The current findings also have implications for models of infant perseveration that use age as a parameter because, in this experiment, infants of the same age performed differently (e.g., Thelen et al., 2001) . Age is a convenient stand-in for other explanatory mechanisms. In this case, skill and experience seem to be implicated as factors that are associated with age but may have more explanatory power as mechanisms underlying development.
In summary, according to a cognitive capacity account, the allocation of infants' attentional resources is determined by the difficulty of the task they are performing. Task difficulty, in turn, depends on infants' expertise in the required skills. When cognitive and motor demands overtax infants' resources, there is a trade-off between cognition and action. When effort on a task increases, infants sacrifice their weakest skills to carry out the task to the best of their abilities by focusing their attention on the more central aspects of the task (Kahneman, 1973) . The greatest cognitive demand in the A-not-B task is inhibition, so the trade-off for new reachers or new walkers is perseveration. This account, which does not rely on context or age specifics, fits with existing accounts of cognition-action trade-offs from fields as diverse as psychology, gerontology, and motor rehabilitation; from different domains within fields, such as cognitive, language, or motor development; and from populations ranging in age from infants to older individuals.
